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Protection from the Protectors: Does the
Competition Act Provide an Answer to the
Misuse of Technological Protection Measures?
Keith D. Rose*
INTRODUCTION
Canada has recently joined the ranks of countries that provide legal protec-
tions for Technological Protection Measures (TPMs)1 in its copyright law. Long-
awaited by some, long-feared by others, this feature of the recent Copyright Mod-
ernization Act (CMA)2 remains one of its most controversial elements.3 Supporters
insist that such measures are necessary to defend innovative business models from
the threat of pervasive infringement via online file-sharing. Detractors note that
these measures often vest actual control over usage, not in the rights holder, but in
the device manufacturer.4 The manufacturer could use this control for purposes that
have little to do with restraining infringement of intellectual property rights.5 In-
* B.Sc. (McGill University), M.Sc. (Queen’s University), J.D. (University of Ottawa).
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this article, and Andrée Chénier, for love, support, and proof-reading. This article is the
winning entry in the 2012 IT.Can Student Writing Contest.
1 These kinds of measures are frequently referred to as “Digital Rights Management”
(DRM) schemes. This terminology is potentially problematic, because it can confuse
two different types of schemes. International law distinguishes Technological Protec-
tion Measures, which are aimed at enforcing rights, from Rights Management Informa-
tion (RMI), which is generally aimed at describing rights. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright
Treaty, 20 December 1996, WIPO Publication No 226 (entered into force 6 March
2002) [WCT]. RMI generally has no anticompetitive implication. This article adopts
the more precise international terminology to preserve that distinction.
2 S.C. 2012, c. 20 [CMA].
3 See, e.g., Christine Dobby, “Canada’s copyright overhaul and the digital locks contro-
versy”, Financial Post (29 September 2011) online: Financial Post
<http://business.financialpost.com/2011/09/29/canadas-copyright-conundrum-and-the-
digital-locks-controversy/>.
4 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, “Technological Protections in Copyright Law — Is More
Legal Protection Needed?” (2002) 16:2 Int’l Rev L Comp & Tech 133; see also Russell
McOrmond, infra note 8 and accompanying text and Ian Kerr, “Digital Locks and the
Automation of Virtue” in Michael Geist, ed, From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced
Copyright”: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010)
247 at 267–275.
5 See, e.g., Michael Geist, “Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy:
Defining a Canadian Way?” in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest: The Future of
Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 211 at 245.
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stead, a vendor could use the ability to restrict the use of unauthorized content to
promote a vertically-integrated supply chain, potentially locking out competing
suppliers.
The argument that such controls raise inherent competition law problems was
explicitly addressed to the Legislative Committee on Bill C-32, a predecessor of the
current CMA. Russell McOrmond used the example of the content scrambling sys-
tem (CSS) for Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs) to illustrate how TPMs do not reside
in the content which is subject to copyright, but rather in the hardware and software
that is used to interact with that content.
CSS is an encryption scheme for DVD content. In order to encode or play
back CSS-encoded content, a device manufacturer must first obtain a suitable cryp-
tographic key. These keys are exclusively licensed by the DVD Copy Control As-
sociation (DVD CCA), a consortium of content providers, consumer electronics
manufacturers, and computer hardware and software vendors.6 As a result, this or-
ganization has the ability to impose contractual limits on the ability to encode or
play back CSS-compliant content, which includes essentially all commercial
DVDs.7 In effect, only approved players can play the encoded content, and a group
of nominal competitors controls access to the necessary authorization.
McOrmond suggested that this linkage of authorized content and devices may
fall within the definition of tied selling:
If you are a competitor of the members of the DVD CCA, or for any reason
cannot sign on to their contractual obligations, you will not receive the keys
to encode your own content or decode content. It should be reviewed by the
Competition Bureau to determine whether such contractual obligations
should be allowed. Tying the ability to access content encoded with DVD
CCA keys requiring a DVD CCA-approved access device seems like a text-
book example of “tied selling” under section 77 of the Competition Act.8
This article attempts to assess this claim. Specifically, it asks whether Part
VIII of the Competition Act9 is capable of addressing these concerns, while permit-
ting the potential benefits that rights holders seek. The argument proceeds in two
parts.
First, the analysis is contextualized by examining how challenges to the an-
ticompetitive effects of TPMs have been treated in other jurisdictions. Although the
details vary, the fundamental themes and issues of competition law tend to be simi-
lar around the world. Useful insights can be drawn from a comparative review of
the global jurisprudence.
6 US, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, “Notice Pursuant to the National Coop-
erative Research and Production Act of 1993; DVD Copy Control Association (‘DVD
CCA’)” (3 August 2001) 66:150 Federal Register 40727 [US Dept of Justice,
“Notice”].
7 There are a few exceptions. For example, Revolution OS, a film about the Linux oper-
ating system, is commercially available in a CSS-free DVD format; see Revolution OS,
online: Revolution OS Store <http://www.revolution-os.com/store1.html>.
8 Legislative Committee on Bill C-32, 3d Sess, 40th Parl, Evidence, Meeting 17
(8 March 2011) at 4-5 (testimony of Russell McOrmond).
9 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34 [Competition Act].
PROTECTION FROM THE PROTECTORS   119
Then, the analysis turns to two key sections of the Canadian Act. Sections 77
(Tied Selling) and 79 (Abuse of Dominant Position) may each potentially apply to
the conduct of concern. These sections will be examined by testing them against
the Apple iTunes ecosystem. A single vendor example will be easier to analyze
than an alleged conspiracy. Moreover, the case represents a high-water mark in that
Apple has a dominant position in both the content and the device businesses. If the
Competition Act can restrain the anticompetitive exclusionary effect of TPMs in
general, these facts should provide a suitable test case.
I. LEGAL TREATMENT OF ANTICOMPETITIVE ABUSE OF
TPMS AROUND THE WORLD
(a) United States
(i) RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, Inc.
The first case of interest concerns the very subject matter that McOrmond
raised: the exclusive licensing practices of the DVD CCA. On September 8, 2008,
RealNetworks (Real), an early leader in streaming media technologies, announced
a new product called RealDVD. This was a software application designed to allow
consumers to copy the content of encrypted DVDs to PCs or portable hard drives
so that it could be played back without the original discs.10 Real had delayed the
product launch because of on-going discussions with the motion picture studios,
who were concerned about the potential ability to copy discs the consumer did not
own. Those negotiations were unsuccessful.
On September 30, 2008, Real launched both the product and a lawsuit against
the studios and the DVD CCA seeking a declaration that the product did not violate
either US copyright law or Real’s CSS license agreement. The studios counter-
claimed and obtained a preliminary injunction blocking Real from manufacturing,
distributing, or otherwise trafficking in the product. After the preliminary injunc-
tion hearings, but before the order issued, Real amended its complaint to include
antitrust claims under both federal and state law, essentially arguing that the DVD
CCA itself was an illegal cartel.11
The studios and DVD CCA succeeded on a motion to dismiss these claims.
Real had no standing to pursue antitrust relief because the only harm it alleged, the
inability to market its product, resulted from the injunction against it and not from
the alleged cartel agreement. Strictly, the decision was based on deficiencies of the
pleadings. But Patel J. also denied leave to amend the pleadings on the grounds that
it would be an exercise in futility; the complaints could not possibly succeed.12
Patel J. noted two fatal problems. First, at the preliminary injunction stage, she
had concluded that the studios were likely to prevail on their claims that Real’s
10 RealNetworks, “RealNetworks Introduces RealDVD: The Best Way to Watch DVDs”
(8 September 2008), online: RealNetworks <http://www.realnetworks.com/
pressroom/releases/2008/090808_realdvd.aspx>.
11 Opinion Re: Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’/Counter-Defendants’ Antitrust Counter-
claims at 2–4, RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association, Inc., (No. 3:08-
CV-04548), ECF No. 484, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal., 2009) [RealAT].
12 Ibid. at 12.
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product was illegal under the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act.13 These claims included circumvention of TPMs that were not
covered by the CSS license agreement. So, even if Real had the right to bypass
CSS, the injunction would most likely have been issued anyway.14 Second, and
more significantly for this analysis, Real had not alleged that the studios refused to
license their content outside of the supposed cartel. If either Real or consumers
could obtain the content free of CSS encryption, then a refusal to license CSS
decryption would be no barrier to entry to the market for management and playback
of digital media files.15
This analysis rests entirely on Real’s situation and conduct. It does not con-
sider the conduct of the DVD CCA at all, nor does it deal with the merits of the
claim that there is an anticompetitive cartel. In the wake of this decision, and based
on a thorough review of the facts on record in the case, Turetzky argued that a full
Rule of Reason analysis leads to the conclusion that there is such a cartel.16
The Rule of Reason involves a four-stage inquiry into: 1) the specific restraint;
2) its anticompetitive effects; 3) any countervailing pro-competitive effects; and 4)
whether the parties have market power. The core of the analysis is the balancing of
pro- and anticompetitive effects to determine whether an impugned practice is rea-
sonable. At the risk of oversimplifying Turetzky’s analysis, his basic argument was
that the practice is unreasonable because it is more restrictive than would be neces-
sary to protect the legitimate interests of the rights holders. In particular, Turetzky
drew an analogy to the studios’ former practice of tying access to high demand
works to contracts for lower demand works, which had been ruled to violate the
Sherman Act.17 The US Supreme Court asserted that copyright law did not include
a right to extend the statutory monopoly to anticompetitive ends.18
Tureztky argued that the relevant market for the analysis was CSS-encrypted
DVD content, not digital video generally.19 In fact, this would seem to be the piv-
otal issue. If there is a distinct market for CSS-encrypted content, it would be im-
possible to argue that the DVD CCA does not control access to it. Developing,
promoting, and licensing CSS technology is the entire purpose of the organiza-
tion.20 Access to that technology is expressly contingent on acceptance of the terms
imposed by the cartel, which are not subject to negotiation and which can only be
modified with the unanimous consent of all members.21
13 17 U.S.C. s. 1201–1205 [DMCA].
14 RealAT, supra note 11 at 8.
15 Ibid. at 8.
16 Matthew W Turetzky, “Comment: DVD Copy Protection Rules Violate The Sherman
Act” (2010-2011) 11 Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law
103.
17 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948); Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 USC ss. 1–7 [Sherman Act].
18 RealAT, ibid. at 158; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19 Turetzky, supra note 16 at 122, 144 and note 244.
20 Ibid at para. 7; see also US Dept of Justice, “Notice”, supra note 6.
21 Turetzky, supra note 16 at 116.
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If, however, the relevant market is broader than that, this may not be conclu-
sive. Patel J. did not make any formal determination of what the relevant product
market was; she relied on Real’s pleadings. As noted above, however, she seemed
to favour the broader view. In a more complete analysis, one might still have to
determine whether the DVD CCA held market power in the broader market.
A reasonable prima facie argument can be made that it did, at least at the time.
While the higher-resolution Blu-Ray format is gaining in popularity, in 2011 DVDs
still accounted for 75–80 percent of the US disc-based market by unit sales.22 This
is down from 90 percent or more in 2008.23 On a revenue basis, DVD sales ac-
counted for 44 percent of the total US video market in 2010, with combined rental
revenues totalling 35 percent, Blu-Ray sales accounting for about 8 percent, and
digital downloads and Video On Demand services another 13 percent.24 If short-
term rentals are excluded, that would translate to roughly a 2/3 share of the sales
market by revenue for DVDs.25 It may, however, be reasonable to conclude that
rentals are a substitute for sales of media products and they should, therefore, be
considered in the same market. In any case, DVDs presumably account for a com-
parable proportion of the rental market.
On any view it seems that DVDs account for a dominant share of the market,
but it also seems that the DVD share of the broader market is declining. It may be
open to question whether the DVD CCA has market power. If nothing else, the
presence of alternative formats and business models convinced Patel J. that the
rights holders had not entirely ruled out the possibility of licensing their content
outside of the DVD CCA “cartel.” Entry into the broader market remained
possible.26
In fact, Real tried and failed to reach independent license agreements with at
least some of the studios.27 The studios may only be willing to entertain certain
kinds of offers and not others. One might be able to argue that the CSS license is
22 See, e.g., Blu-RayStats.com, which approximates US market share based on the top 20
best-selling titles in a week, online: Blu-RayStats.com <http://www.blu-
raystats.com/MarketShare/index.php>.
23 See Dave Cowl, “Market Share Blu-ray vs DVD, Week Ending June 7th” (13 June
2008), online: Format War Central <http://formatwarcentral.com/2008/06/13/market-
share-blu-ray-vs-dvd-week-ending-june-7th/>; see also Geoff Duncan, “Blu-ray Mar-
ket Share . . . Drops?” (24 September 2008), online: Digital Trends
<http://www.digitaltrends.com/home-theater/blu-ray-market-sharedrops/>.
24 Associated Press, “US home video revenue down; DVD sales off 16.5 pct” (23 October
2010), online: Washington Times <http://www.washingtontimes.com>.
25 That would actually be an underestimate as it would include Video on Demand ser-
vices, which are not sales. Netflix, which operates on a subscription basis, currently
accounts for over 60 percent of the pure digital download market. The industry views
digital video as a single market, combining subscription-based services like Netflix
with title-based services like Apple’s iTunes. See, e.g., Zak Stambor, “Netflix domi-
nates digital video retailing” (15 March 2011), online: Internet Retailer
<http://www.internetretailer.com/2011/03/15/netflix-dominates-digital-video-
retailing>.
26 RealAT, supra note 11 at 8.
27 Ibid. at 11.
122   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [11 C.J.L.T.]
really just one element of a broader anticompetitive practice, though such an argu-
ment would be outside of the scope of a discussion of the role of TPMs.
It is important to note, however, that the general purpose of competition law is
to ensure the proper functioning of markets, not to guarantee that would-be compet-
itors can obtain terms of their choosing. Real’s failure to obtain consent for its
proposals may not be cognizable as a competition problem.
(ii) Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc.
One of the lessons to be drawn from the RealNetworks case is that who the
plaintiff is matters. While Real’s complaint against the DVD CCA was dismissed
for lack of standing, Melanie Tucker’s antitrust complaint against Apple for unlaw-
ful tying and attempted monopolization initially survived a motion to dismiss.28
Ms. Tucker brought her complaint as a consumer who had purchased both an iPod
music player and music files from Apple. She alleged that Apple deliberately made
its iPod hardware incompatible with music, and its music files incompatible with
hardware, supplied by other vendors. She further alleged that, as a result, Apple
was able to charge a “supracompetitive price” and that its practices “[deterred] con-
sumers from even considering doing business with its competitors’ music and video
stores, allowing it to monopolize these markets.”29
Tucker pled a per se illegal tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Ware J. set out the required elements as follows: 
To establish that a tying arrangement is per se illegal, a plaintiff must prove
(1) a tie between two separate products or services sold in separate markets;
(2) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to affect the tied
market; and (3) an effect on a substantial volume of commerce in the tied
product market. Implicit in these elements is the need of the seller of the
tying product “to force the buyer into the purchase of the tied product that
the buyer did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms.”30
Tucker had alleged facts sufficient, if proven, to establish all three elements.
Significantly, Ware J. held that there was no need for Tucker to demonstrate
that Apple coerced her to buy anything. All that was required was “use by the seller
of its ‘leverage’ to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a
competitive market.”31 Tucker’s allegation that the technical limitations Apple de-
liberately imposed on its iPods forced consumers to obtain their music from Ap-
ple’s iTunes store was enough for the complaint to survive the motion to dismiss.
Apple argued there was no tie because consumers could (and some did) buy
the devices without buying any media files, or vice versa. Ware J. considered this
28 Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d. 1090 (N.D. Cal., 2006) [Tucker].
29 Ibid. at 1095.
30 Ibid. at 1096 [citations omitted]; Sherman Act, supra note 17.
31 Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F. 2d. 1202 at 1204 (9th Cir., 1988),
quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 N. 20, 104 S.
Ct. 1551, 80 L. Ed. 2d 2 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1984).
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irrelevant. Citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs.,32 he stated that the
mere fact that some consumers might choose to buy the products separately was no
barrier to a tying claim.33
Apple also argued that the complaint amounted to a demand that Apple deal
with a competitor, which was subject to the analysis set out in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Trinko.34 In that case the US Supreme Court recognized a
qualified right for companies to refuse to deal with their competitors. The dividing
line was motivation: if the refusal to deal was intended to exclude competition,
rather than to achieve some legitimate business goal, it would violate the Sherman
Act.35
The plaintiff had alleged that Apple had made a deliberate decision to make its
products incompatible with those of its competitors. In Ware J.’s view, this
amounted to an allegation that Apple had deliberately chosen to forego potential
sales. The plaintiff had further alleged that, by doing so, Apple was able to main-
tain its prices above competitive levels and deterred consumers from dealing with
its competitors. Ware J. held that these facts were sufficient, if proven, to establish
that Apple had acted with an anticompetitive intention. The potential business justi-
fications that Apple had raised were questions of fact that were not appropriate for
resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.36
The Tucker action was later consolidated into a class action and, although
some of the claims were certified, the court decided sua sponte to reconsider
whether the tying claim was cognizable. In May 2009, Ware J. dismissed the per se
tying claim. After reviewing the case law on “technological ties,” he concluded that
a technological interrelationship between products, without more, was not enough
to establish per se unlawful tying.37 A technological tie could potentially be unlaw-
ful if the seller’s dominant purpose was to compel purchase of an entire package,
but consumers were free to purchase iPods separately from iTunes music. In effect,
Ware J. held that for the tie to be per se unlawful the consumer would have to be
deprived of any reasonable option to obtain the products separately.38 The plaintiffs
had not pleaded any such deprivation. On the contrary, they admitted the devices
and music files were available separately.
Five months later, Ware J. also dismissed the tying claim based on the Rule of
Reason, for similar reasons. It was not enough to allege that the products were less
useful if they were not used together. Both the music and the devices were availa-
ble separately and each could be used without the other. “The increased conve-
nience of using the two products together due to technological compatibility does
32 504 U.S. 451, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992).
33 Tucker, supra note 28 at 1098.
34 540 U.S. 398, 124 S. Ct. 872, 157 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2004).
35 Ibid. at 409; see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
at 604–609, 105 S. Ct. 2847, 86 L Ed 2d 467 (1985); Sherman Act, supra note 17.
36 Tucker, supra note 28 at 1101.
37 The Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, (No. C 05-00037), Doc. 213 at 7 (N.D.
Cal., 2009).
38 Ibid. at 8.
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not constitute anticompetitive conduct under either per se or rule of reason
analysis.”39
But the monopolization claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act survived a
second motion to dismiss in 2010, based on the same argument.40 The pleadings
included allegations that Apple had intentionally modified its software to prevent
music purchased from a rival music store from being playable on Apple’s devices
and to prevent music purchased from the iTunes Store from being played on com-
petitors’ devices. These claims were independent of any technological inter-rela-
tionship between Apple’s products and were distinct from the tying claim.41
As of this writing, the action is in discovery.42 There has not yet been any trial
on the merits.
(b) France
(i) Competition Council review of Apple’s refusal to license FairPlay
(2004)
The French Competition Council43 addressed a very similar complaint in
2004.44 VirginMega,45 an online music retailer based in France, used Microsoft’s
Windows Media DRM system, which is not supported by Apple’s portable devices.
VirginMega wished to license Apple’s proprietary FairPlay system so that it could
make its offerings compatible with Apple devices; Apple refused. VirginMega
brought an abuse of dominance complaint under Article L-420.2 of the French
Commercial Code and Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 of the Treaty
of the Functioning of the European Union).46 On a preliminary review, the Council
39 The Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, (No. C 05-00037), Doc. 274 at 9 (N.D.
Cal., 2009).
40 Sherman Act, supra note 17.
41 The Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, (No. C 05-00037), Somers v. Apple, (No.
C 07-06507) Doc. 377 at 5–7 (N.D. Cal., 2010).
42 The Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, (No. C 05-00037) Doc. 719, Joint Case
Management Statement (N.D. Cal., 2012).
43 The Council, officially known as Le Conseil de la concurrence, was subsequently re-
placed by L’Autorité de la concurrence, as a result of a substantial restructuring of
French competition law.
44 France, Conseil de la concurence, “Décision nº 04-D-54 du 9 novembre 2004 relative à
des pratiques mises en oeuvre par la socieéteé Apple Computer, Inc. dans les secteurs
du teéleéchargement de musique sur Internet et des baladeurs numeériques.”, (9 No-
vember 2004) online: Autorité de la concurrence,
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf> [VirginMega]. An English
language summary of the decision is available in the Authority’s Press Release; see
online: Autorité de la concurrence, <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/
user/standard.php?id_rub=134&id_article=356>.
45 Although VirginMega shares branding with the UK Virgin Group, it is an unrelated
corporate entity. At the relevant time it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Lagardère Group, which is itself a French-based multinational conglomerate. See
VirginMega, supra note 44 at para. 4.
46 Ibid. at para. 8.
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rejected the complaint for lack of evidence.47 The analysis that it relied on to come
to this conclusion is instructive.
The Council considered three possible product markets that might have been
relevant: a market in TPMs themselves, a market in portable music players, and a
market in paid music downloads.
The Council dispensed with the TPM market relatively quickly. The Council
considered that this market consisted of three main products: Apple’s FairPlay,
Microsoft’s Windows Media DRM, and Sony’s OpenMG.48 The European Com-
mission, in the context of a merger review, had previously concluded that
Microsoft was the market leader. Although the Council noted that this was a rap-
idly evolving market driven by technological innovation that was difficult to pre-
dict, it assumed that in a three-way market that Apple did not lead, Apple could not
have market power.49
The analysis of the portable music player market was more elaborate. The
main question was whether larger capacity hard-drive-based players should be
grouped with smaller capacity flash-memory-based players. The Council found that
over the twelve preceding months, Apple’s market share on a dollar value basis
was 25 percent if all players were considered, rising to 53 percent if only hard-
drive-based players were considered.50 But the Council noted that this was an
emerging market, which was changing rapidly. In the circumstances, market share
alone was not a sufficient indicator of potential market power. Other criteria needed
to be considered as well.
The Council cited survey data indicating that consumer preferences rated basic
characteristics like rechargeable batteries, physical size, and the ability to connect
to a computer to be far more important than compatibility with any particular music
format. Only 1 percent of consumers rated compatibility with Apple’s AAC codec
as the most important feature of a music player.51 Moreover, rival products from at
least seven other manufacturers were credible alternatives to the iPod. In response
to this competition, Apple had recently reduced the prices of all iPods by 25 per-
cent. The Council’s view was that this indicated a vigorously competitive market,
characterized by rapid technological innovation originating from multiple en-
trants.52 That said, the question on the preliminary review was whether the evi-
dence excluded any possibility that Apple had market power in the portable music
player market. On balance, the Council considered that it did not.53
The music download market, within France, received the most analysis. The
Council identified six principal actors. Apple’s market share, by volume, had been
estimated to be as high as 75 percent, but the Council noted that in a nascent mar-
47 Ibid. at para. 105.
48 Ibid. at para. 14.
49 Ibid. at para. 40.
50 Ibid. at para. 41.
51 Ibid. at para. 44.
52 Ibid. at para. 50.
53 Ibid. at para. 51.
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ket, there was very little track record. Moreover, the total market size was growing
quickly, so positions could easily change.54
Apple had a first-mover advantage, but multiple competitors had subsequently
entered the market. Entry costs were relatively high; most competitors had report-
edly invested tens of millions of euros in establishing their platforms. But the
Council thought that this cost should be assessed in relation to the scale of the
competitors, who were large multinational corporations. Furthermore, there were
many other potential entrants, including some who were actively pursuing the same
business in nearby geographic markets. Media companies like MTV, software com-
panies like RealNetworks, Internet Service Providers like AOL, and retailers like
Wal-Mart were all potential entrants that had made some forays into the music
download business.55 Finally, the Council noted that there was an alternative to the
paid download model. Subscription-based services were growing more quickly
than paid downloads and were forecast to potentially surpass them on a revenue
basis by 2008.56
These factors combined to cast significant doubt on Apple’s market power.
The Council again seemed inclined to view the market as vigorous and thriving.
Apple did have some significant advantages, but so did its competitors. In particu-
lar, VirginMega could draw on its synergy with a major retail operation and its
knowledge of local market conditions, which Apple lacked.57 But, again, the Coun-
cil concluded that the evidence did not negate the possibility that Apple had market
power.58
The pivotal question, in the Council’s view, was whether Apple’s refusal to
license FairPlay denied the complainant access to an essential input. The Council
concluded that it did not, for three principal reasons. First, the complainant’s offer-
ings were useful to consumers even if they could not be played on Apple’s devices.
The evidence on record was that the majority of consumers played their
downloaded music on computers. One survey indicated that only 15 percent of re-
spondents who downloaded music at least once a month transferred it to any porta-
ble device.59 Apple’s refusal to license FairPlay was no barrier to playing the com-
plainant’s music on computers.
Second, it was possible to load the complainant’s music on Apple’s devices
via the simple expedient of burning the music to a CD and then re-encoding it as an
unprotected MP3 file. The Council asserted this was legal, even though it would
seem to run contrary to at least the spirit of legal protections for TPMs. At the time
of the decision, however, France had not enacted legislation implementing those
54 Ibid. at para. 53.
55 Ibid. at paras. 57–61.
56 Ibid. at para. 62.
57 Ibid. at para. 63.
58 Ibid. at para. 64.
59 Ibid. at para. 78.
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protections.60 The Council’s attention was on the terms of the relevant consumer
agreements, not copyright law or international obligations.
Nonetheless, this argument is not entirely satisfying. If selling music free of
TPMs was acceptable to VirginMega, presumably it would simply have chosen that
option in the first place. This would clearly have been more convenient and, there-
fore, should have been an attractive option to consumers. VirginMega’s agreements
with the rights holders probably prohibited it from selling music without acceptable
TPMs in place.61 Surely sustainable competition cannot be founded on the techni-
cal possibility that consumers could convert VirginMega’s product into a different
one which it did not wish to, and may have been legally unable to, offer. Such an
argument effectively expands the product market to include potentially unlawful
copies. It seems untenable to suggest that the answer to anticompetitive behaviour
by a dominant player is competition by unlawful means.
The Council’s third line of reasoning was perhaps more compelling: FairPlay,
or even compatibility with iPods, was not the reason for Apple’s success in the
music market. There was, therefore, no causal link between Apple’s market posi-
tion and the allegedly abusive behaviour. The Council highlighted multiple distin-
guishing factors including price, catalogue size, terms, and promotional activities
which may have made the iTunes music store more attractive to consumers than
VirginMega’s platform.62 Given the consumer preference data, the Council put rel-
atively little weight on Apple’s tight integration between its online store and its
devices as an explanation for its success in the music market. Thus compatibility
with iPods could not be considered essential, especially given the large number of
alternative devices which supported the format VirginMega used. VirginMega
could compete with Apple on other factors that were more important to consumers.
Moreover, the Council also considered Apple’s evidence that it had legitimate
business reasons for not wanting to license the FairPlay technology. Apple’s con-
tracts with the major record labels imposed obligations on it to maintain the effec-
tiveness of the TPM. Apple maintained that licensing FairPlay to third parties
would undermine its control of the technology, making the TPM more vulnerable
to penetration and increasing its costs to rectify any breach.63
Three elements had to be established to make out abuse of dominance based
on deprivation of an essential input: there had to be no actual or plausible substitute
for the input, there had to be a demonstrated risk of complete elimination of compe-
60 This law was not enacted until 1 August 2006. See Loi nº 2006-961 du 1er août 2006
relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information, J.O., 3
August 2006, 11529 [Dadvsi].
61 The Council did not discuss VirginMega’s agreements with record labels, but it seems
reasonable to expect that they would have been substantially similar to Apple’s agree-
ments with the same rights holders. Not only did Apple’s agreements at the time re-
quire the music files to be protected by TPMs but, if that protection was breached, the
rights holders had the right to withdraw their entire catalogues from the iTunes music
store if the breach could not be rectified within a few weeks. See VirginMega, supra
note 44 at paras. 93-94; see also Steve Jobs, “Thoughts on Music” (6 February 2007),
online: Apple <http://www.apple.com/fr/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/>.
62 VirginMega, supra note 44, at paras. 90–92.
63 Ibid. at paras. 93-94.
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tition, and there had to be a causal connection between the dominant position and
the allegedly abusive conduct.64 The Council concluded the evidence on the record
could not establish any of the three. The complaint had no prospect of success.
(ii) Sony v. UFC-Que Choisir
Somewhat similar facts, argued by different parties on a different legal theory,
led to quite different results in the following year. In 2005, L’Association Union
Fédérale des Consomnateurs — Que Choisir (UFC-Que Choisir), a federation of
consumer groups, brought an action in France against Sony France and Sony UK
Ltd.65 The complaint alleged the music files supplied by the Sony Connect Music
Store, operated by Sony UK Ltd., were not playable on portable music devices
other than the ones sold by Sony France. Sony had developed a proprietary music
format, called ATRAC, which was designed with the specific goal of efficient
hardware implementation.66 It also offered an associated “copyright management,
protection, and online distribution technology,” called OpenMG.67 The Connect
Music Store only offered content in these proprietary formats, which were not sup-
ported by non-Sony music players. Similarly, the portable devices sold by Sony
France were allegedly unable to play music files acquired from other legal
download sites.68 In a 2006 decision, the Court of First Instance found Sony liable
for both misleading practices and tied selling.69
The statutory provisions at play in the case reside in the French Consumer
Code.70 Significantly, they do not involve any element relating to restraint of com-
petition. But otherwise they are comparable to the practices of Deceptive Market-
ing and Tied Selling as defined in the Competition Act.71
The heart of the misleading practices complaint was that Sony had not clearly
informed consumers of the limitations of both the devices and the music files. The
court first considered and rejected an argument that the Consumer Code did not
apply to intangibles on the basis that the contract was for a service rather than an
abstract license to an intellectual property right. It then proceeded to carefully parse
64 Ibid. at para. 96.
65 Tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre, (15 December 2000) Sony v. UFC — Que
Choisir, online: Juriscom.net <http://www.juriscom.net/> [QueChoisir]; for an English
summary of the decision, see Bradley L Joslove, Olivier Haas & Vanessa De
Spiegeleer-Delort, “Sony Online Music Platform and Music Players in Breach of Con-
sumer Law” (31 May 2007), online: International Law Office
<http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=cdd1cf4d-ed09-
42b5-8c1a-3552fe5ed380#1>.
66 Sony, “ATRAC Developer’s Interview” (September 2004), online: Sony
<http://www.sony.net/Products/ATRAC3/special/developers01.html>.
67 Sony, “What is OpenMG?” (2004), online: Sony
<http://www.openmginfo.com/overview/index.html>.
68 QueChoisir, supra note 65 at 3.
69 Ibid. at 13-14.
70 Code de la consommation, Art. L.213-1 and L.122-1.
71 Competition Act, supra note 9, ss. 74.01, 77.
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the applicable agreement.72 The court found that the terms misleadingly suggested
that the “examples” of compatible hardware were not a complete and closed list.
The court found this to be an intentional misrepresentation that knowingly con-
cealed material information from the consumer.73
The court dealt with the allegation of tied selling in an almost summary fash-
ion. The court characterized the provision as effectively defining a strict liability
offence: “En tout état de cause, s’agissant d’une contravention, l’élement intention-
nel de cette infraction importe peu.”74 It did not matter that there was no express
agreement that tied the two transactions together. The fact that there was a double
use restriction, in that both the service and the device were dependent on each
other, was enough to find that the sales were tied.75
Despite this finding, the court did not attempt to constrain the use of the TPMs
that bound the products together. The court recognized that those TPMs were ex-
pressly authorized by and given legal protection in European and French copyright
law.76 It concluded that the product and service were lawful, provided that the con-
sumer was fully informed of the limitations imposed by the TPMs.77 In addition to
monetary penalties, the order merely required clear information on both the product
packaging and the service’s web site.78
In the wake of that case, two subsequent developments are worth noting. The
first is that Sony’s efforts in this market were ultimately commercially unsuccess-
ful. Sony abandoned the ATRAC and OpenMG formats and shut down the Connect
Music Store in 2008.79 It is no longer possible to authorize new devices to play
ATRAC content protected by the OpenMG system, although existing devices can
continue to operate. Sony advised customers who had purchased its TPM-protected
music files to remove the TPMs by the same method suggested by the Competition
Council in VirginMega.80
The second is that UFC-Que Choisir launched a similar lawsuit against Apple
in 2005 with essentially identical pleadings. That case was removed from the
72 QueChoisir, supra note 65 at 11.
73 Ibid. at 12.
74 Approximately: in any event, as a regulatory offence, the intentional element of this
infraction is of little importance; Ibid. at 13.
75 Ibid. at 14.
76 Ibid. at 10, citing Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights
in the information society and article L.331-7 of the French Intellectual Property Code.
77 QueChoisir, supra note 65 at 14.
78 Ibid. at 15-16.
79 Anthony Bruno, “Sony shutting down Connect Music Store” (30 August 2007), online:
Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/01/industry-sonyconnect-dc-
idUSN3044730220070901>.
80 Ibid. See also Eliot Van Buskirk, “Sony Connect Music Store Closing (Sony Players to
Add PlaysforSure)”, Wired (30 August 2007), online: Wired
<http://www.wired.com/listening_post/2007/08/sony-connect-mu/>.
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docket on April 7, 2009.81 This was the precise date when the complete iTunes
music catalogue was made available free of TPMs.82
(c) Norway: Consumer Ombudsman review of iTunes Terms and
Conditions (2006)
Norway’s approach demonstrates a different option for controlling the poten-
tial negative consequences of TPMs. In 2006, the Norwegian Consumer Council
brought a complaint to Norway’s Consumer Ombudsman alleging that Apple’s
iTunes Music Store’s standard terms and conditions violated Norway’s Marketing
Control Act as well as European competition law, as reflected in Articles 81 and 82
of the Treaty of Rome.83 On a strict view, this proceeding does not fit entirely com-
fortably within the boundaries of the present analysis. The competition law com-
plaint was restricted to Apple’s imposition of geographic market restrictions that
permitted discriminatory pricing.84 The primary legal theory of the complaint was
that Apple’s use of TPMs breached the Marketing Control Act prohibition of unrea-
sonable terms and conditions in consumer contracts; the underlying allegation, once
again, was that Apple imposed TPMs to enhance its market position, not to protect
rights holders. 
It is the view of the Consumer Council that iTunes’ DRM is an unreasona-
ble technical term of use, in so far as it prevents purchasers of music files at
iTunes from using other MP3 players than iPods. The sole purpose of this
type of DRM is to lock consumers into buying products from a dominant
market player.85
The complaint was largely successful: the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman
ordered Apple to change the iTunes terms and conditions.86 In particular, the
81 See Apple, Form 10-Q (27 July 2009) at 45, online: Apple
<http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-09-153165&CIK
=320193>.
82 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, “DRM Ends, Variable Pricing Begins for iTunes Music”,
Washington Post (7 April 2009) online: Washington Post <http://voices.
washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2009/04/the_drm_era_ends_for_itunes_mu.html>.
83 Norwegian Consumer Council, “Complaint against iTunes Music Store”, Letter to the
Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman (25 January 2006) in English translation, online:
Forbrukerrådet <http://forbrukerportalen.no/filearchive/Complaint%20against
%20iTunes%20Music%20Store.pdf> [Norwegian Consumer Council].
84 Ibid. at 4-5. At the time, this issue was under investigation by the European Commis-
sion, which levelled formal charges in 2007, but withdrew them in 2008 after Apple
took steps to equalize its pricing across EU countries. See AFP, “EU drops antitrust
case against Apple’s iTunes” (9 January 2008), online: AFP
<http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gmnlrgq_NITt4LcgfYokGLeCzK_g>.
85 Norwegian Consumer Council, supra note 83 at 3.
86 Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman, “Terms of Service to the iTunes Music Store —
Marketing Act, §9a”, Letter to iTunes SARL, Luxembourg (30 May 2006), English
translation via Google translate, online: Forbrukerombudet
<http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/asset/2406/1/2406_1.pdf> [Ombudsman]. For an
English summary, see Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman, “iTunes violates Norwegian
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Ombudsman declared that copyright law granted no right to impose otherwise un-
lawful contractual terms. He expressed significant concern about Apple’s use of
TPMs, noting that their anticompetitive effects could lead to adverse price conse-
quences for consumers.87 Seven months later, after soliciting reply comments from
Apple, the Ombudsman issued a final ruling that the use of TPMs to achieve plat-
form lock-in was illegal.88 As noted above, Apple ultimately abandoned the use of
FairPlay on music files sold via the iTunes Store.89
II. APPLICATION OF PART VIII OF THE COMPETITION ACT
(a) Standing
Having reviewed the foreign jurisprudence involving challenges to TPMs, the
focus of this inquiry can turn to its core question: whether Part VIII of the Competi-
tion Act provides a means to control the potential abuse of TPMs. By analogy to the
foreign cases discussed above, the most likely provisions to be applied would seem
to be the Tied Selling provision in section 77 or the Abuse of Dominance provision
in section 79. Before considering these provisions in detail, however, a threshold
question arises: who would have standing to invoke them?
The answer to that question depends in part on the provision selected. The
Commissioner of Competition, with the support of the Competition Bureau, has the
statutory authority and responsibility for the enforcement of the Competition Act.90
Section 79 applies “on application by the Commissioner,” while section 77 also
applies on an application by “a person granted leave under section 103.1.”91 The
Competition Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear these applications.92 Civil
courts have confirmed that section 77 does not give rise to a free-standing cause of
action.93 Furthermore, conduct falling within section 79 is not unlawful unless the
Competition Tribunal issues a prohibition order. In the absence of such an order,
there can be no action for damages under section 36.94 Since the complaints in
VirginMega and RealNetworks can best be analogized to section 79, under Cana-
law (7 June 2006), online Forbrukerombudet <http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/
id/11032467.0>.
87 Ibid. at 10.
88 Pinsent Masons, “Apple DRM is illegal in Norway, says Ombudsman” (24 January
2007), online: Out-Law <http://www.out-law.com/page-7691>.
89 Rob Pegoraro, supra note 82.
90 Competition Act, supra note 9, s. 7.
91 Ibid. ss. 77 and 79.
92 Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 19 (2d Supp.), s. 8.
93 Ceminchuk v. IBM Canada Ltd. (1995), 62 C.P.R. (3d) 546, 101 F.T.R. 38, 1995 Car-
swellNat 153 (Fed. T.D.); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kimberly-Clark of Canada
Ltd. (1992), 40 C.P.R. (3d) 1 at 55 (Fed. T.D.), Harbord Insurance Services Ltd. v.
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 81 at 88 (B.C. S.C.).
94 Novus Entertainment Inc. v. Shaw Cablesystems Ltd., 2010 BCSC 1030, 2010 Car-
swellBC 1962, at para. 37; see also Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 2006
BCSC 1047, 40 C.C.L.T. (3d) 45, [2006] 11 W.W.R. 688, 57 B.C.L.R. (4th) 323, 2006
CarswellBC 1691, at para. 49, ; additional reasons 2006 CarswellBC 2892 (S.C.).
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dian law, those applications could only have been brought by the Commissioner,
and only to the Tribunal.95
By contrast, section 77 can be directly invoked by a private party, but only
with leave of the Tribunal. The Tribunal may grant leave if it “has reason to believe
that the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the applicants’ business
by any practice referred to in [s. 77] that could be subject to an order under that
section.”96
The Federal Court of Appeal has defined the applicable legal test. The appli-
cant must essentially demonstrate a prima facie case. The Tribunal must find that
there is some evidence to establish all of the elements required to justify an order,
but: 
The threshold for an applicant obtaining leave is not a difficult one to meet.
It need only provide sufficient credible evidence of what is alleged to give
rise to a bona fide belief by the Tribunal. This is a lower standard of proof
than proof on a balance of probabilities which will be the standard applica-
ble to the decision on the merits.97
The applicant must have a direct business interest at stake. For example, a
trade association may not bring the application on behalf of its members even if the
members themselves are directly affected.98 Furthermore, the impact must be sub-
stantial. The Tribunal has indicated this must be quantified and assessed with re-
gard to the impact on the complainant’s enterprise as a whole, not just a subset of
the business that relates to the complaint.99 Finally, the complaint must be some-
thing that could lead to an order, which means that it must fall within the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction.100 Notably, the Tribunal does not have the authority to order a com-
pulsory license to an exclusive intellectual property right.101
Neither consumers nor their representatives would be likely to obtain leave
under section 103.1, since they would not be able to demonstrate a direct and sub-
stantial effect in their business. Consequently, neither the Tucker action nor the
Que Choisir action could have succeeded in Canada unless the application was
brought by the Commissioner. As none of the foreign actions discussed above
95 The complaint in RealNetworks could also be analogized to s. 90.1, which would be
treated the same way.
96 Competition Act, supra note 9, s. 103.1(7).
97 Barcode Systems Inc. v. Symbol Technologies Canada ULC, 2004 FCA 339, [2005] 2
F.C.R. 254, 2004 CarswellNat 3582, at para. 17.
98 Canadian Standard Travel Agent Registry v. International Air Transport Assn., 2008
Comp. Trib. 14, 2008 CarswellNat 2593.
99 Construx Engineering Corp. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd., 2005 Comp. Trib. 21,
2005 CarswellNat 7062, at para. 8.
100 National Capital News Canada v. Canada (Speaker of the House of Commons), 2002
Comp. Trib. 41 at paras. 16–29, 23 C.P.R. (4th) 77, 2002 CarswellNat 4487; affirmed
2004 CarswellNat 124 (F.C.A.) (holding that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to issue
an order that could breach Parliamentary privilege).
101 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Warner Music Canada Ltd. (1997),
78 C.P.R. (3d) 321, 43 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1997 CarswellNat 281 (Competition Trib.)
[Warner].
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could have been initiated in Canada without the assistance of the Commissioner, it
is clear that a Canadian complainant is operating under a procedural handicap,
compared to other jurisdictions.102
The Commissioner can be compelled to hold an inquiry into whether grounds
exist for an order under Part VIII by any six adult residents of Canada, but the
decision to bring an application to the Tribunal is at her discretion.103 Assuming
that a proper application was before the Tribunal, the complainant would have to
prove the substantive elements required to justify an order. Each of the sections
features its own unique issues, which must be considered in turn.
(b) Section 77: Tied Selling
Section 77 actually defines three distinct reviewable practices: exclusive deal-
ing, market restriction, and tied selling. Consideration of tied selling will suffice for
present purposes. The other two practices have no likely application to the para-
digm case of a device manufacturer who is excluded from a potential market be-
cause of a rival’s use of a TPM to control access to content products.
The Competition Act defines tied selling to include two kinds of express ties.
The first is the traditional case where supply of one product (the tying product) is
conditional on acquisition of another (the tied product). The second arises if the
acquirer is limited to only using or distributing the tying product with designated
supplies. The precise wording of this provision may be important. The purchaser of
the tying product must be required to: 
refrain from using or distributing, in conjunction with the tying product, an-
other product that is not of a brand or manufacture designated by the sup-
plier or the nominee.104
Tied selling under the Act does not require that the products may only be acquired
together. It is enough for the supplier to offer the tying product on favourable terms
as an inducement for the purchaser to voluntarily combine it with the tied product.
This is broader than the requirement in Tucker that there be no reasonable opportu-
nity to acquire the products separately. A mere package discount may be enough to
engage this definition.
However, the definition is not the end of the matter. To justify an order, the
complainant must also prove: 1) that the tied selling was engaged in by a “major
supplier” or that the practice was widespread in the market; 2) that the practice had
102 This is not to suggest that there is no merit to the Canadian approach. On the contrary,
it seems to be theoretically sound. The Competition Act is primarily aimed at public
wrongs resulting from a lack of competition, not the private harms that might be suf-
fered by any particular competitor. Consequently it is entirely appropriate that a public
entity should be responsible for, and have control over, proceedings under the Act. On
appropriate facts, aggrieved parties will also have recourse to private law causes of
action, such as the tort of intentional interference with economic relations, to protect
their private interests. See, e.g., Canadian Community Reading Plan Inc. v. Quality
Service Programs Inc., 2001 CarswellOnt 174 (Ont. C.A.); additional reasons 2001
CarswellOnt 853 (Ont. C.A.).
103 Competition Act, supra note 9, s. 9.
104 Competition Act, supra note 9, s. 77(1), “tied selling” (a)(ii).
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an exclusionary effect; and 3) that the practice resulted in, or was likely to result in,
a substantial lessening of competition.105
The first element is similar, but not identical, to a requirement that the supplier
have market power, although market power will be sufficient to establish it.106 The
Tribunal has defined the criterion: “A major or important supplier is one whose
actions are taken to have an appreciable or significant impact on the markets where
it sells.”107 A 30 percent market share was enough for Bombardier to be a major
supplier because of its historical position as an industry leader and its innovation in
product development: “[t]he characteristics which are most relevant will vary from
industry to industry.”108 This strength must be assessed in relation to the tying
product which is being leveraged.
The second and third elements are typically dealt with together, with the ex-
clusion simply being the means by which competition is lessened.109 The question
is not whether there is substantial competition, but whether the impugned practice
has, or is likely to have, the result of substantially lessening competition. The Fed-
eral Court of Appeal described the relevant test as a “but-for” analysis: “would the
relevant markets [. . .] be substantially more competitive but for the impugned prac-
tice of anticompetitive acts?”110 Market power and the presence or absence of bar-
riers to entry will be critical to the analysis: 
Generally speaking, a substantial lessening or prevention of competition is
an effect that creates, preserves, or enhances market power. [. . .] A firm can
create, preserve, or enhance market power by erecting or strengthening bar-
riers to entry, thus inhibiting potential competitors from challenging the
market power of the dominant firm.111
In the paradigm case described above, the complainant would be a device
manufacturer. The tying product would be the TPM-restricted content and the tied
product would be the player implementing the TPM. The competing device manu-
facturer is excluded because of the inability to use the content, which someone else
controls. But this is not the only possible scenario. For example, game consoles
will generally not execute unauthorized software. This allows the manufacturer to
control third party access to the platform, which it can either block or license on
terms of its choosing. The manufacturers can sell hardware at a loss which they
105 Ibid. s. 77(2).
106 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc., 1997
CarswellNat 3120, 73 C.P.R. (39) 1 (Competition Trib.), at para 72, 73 [Tele-Direct].
107 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Bombardier Ltd. (1980), 57 C.P.R.
(2d) 216 (R.T.P. Comm.), at 223.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid. at 224; see also Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. NutraSweet
Co., 1990 CarswellNat 1368, [1990] C.C.T.D. No. 17, 32 C.P.R. (3d) 1, [1990] C.L.D.
1078 (Competition Trib.), at para. 168 [NutraSweet].
110 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 233, 49 C.P.R.
(4th) 241, 268 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 350 N.R. 291, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 3, 2006 CarswellNat
1763 at para. 38 [Canada Pipe 1].
111 Competition Bureau, “The Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the
Competition Act) — Draft for Public Consultation” (January 2009) at 19 [AoD].
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recoup, in part, through license fees charged to software publishers.112 In that sce-
nario, the console would be the tying product and the software the tied product. The
complainant would be a publisher who was unable to obtain access to the platform.
None of the cases under consideration involve an explicit tie. Consumers are
free to buy the device independently of the media; on the contrary, as was noted in
Tucker, there is generally no option to buy them together. Nor is there typically any
kind of package pricing to act as an inducement.113 If the paradigm case falls
within the definition of tied selling, it must be in sub-paragraph (a)(ii), quoted
above. Rather than positively tying the products the supplier must require that the
purchaser not use or distribute the tying product in conjunction with some other
product.
The simple objection may be that the supplier in the paradigm case may not
require anything at all of the customer. The purchaser of the content may well be
free to attempt to use that file with any device he or she wishes. It will simply fail
to work with an unauthorized device.
Any legal requirements imposed on the purchaser would be located in the ap-
plicable contractual terms. The Canadian version of the iTunes Store “Terms and
Conditions” contains the following language: 
You agree that the iTunes Service and certain iTunes Products include se-
curity technology that limits your use of iTunes Products and that, whether
or not iTunes Products are limited by security technology, you shall use
iTunes Products in compliance with the applicable usage rules established
by Apple and its licensors (“Usage Rules”), and that any other use of the
iTunes Products may constitute a copyright infringement. Any security tech-
nology is an inseparable part of the iTunes Products. Apple reserves the
right to modify the Usage Rules at any time. You agree not to violate, cir-
cumvent, reverse-engineer, decompile, disassemble, or otherwise tamper
with any of the security technology related to such Usage Rules for any
reason-or to attempt or assist another person to do so. Usage Rules may be
controlled and monitored by Apple for compliance purposes, and Apple
reserves the right to enforce the Usage Rules without notice to you. You
agree not to access the iTunes Service by any means other than through
software that is provided by Apple for accessing the iTunes Service. You
shall not access or attempt to access an Account that you are not authorized
112 See, e.g., “Report: PS3 to sell for $399, cost $494 to make”, GameSpot, (28 June
2005), online: GameSpot <www.gamespot.com/news/report-ps-6128295>.
113 This is not always the case. Apple at one time sold a special edition “U2 iPod,” which
included a US$50 coupon that could be redeemed against the purchase of “The Com-
plete U2,” a so-called digital box-set of over 400 music tracks. The music bundle could
be purchased separately for US$149, while the iPod itself had a suggested retail price
of US$349. See Apple Press Info, “Apple Introduces the U2 iPod” (26 October 2004),
online: Apple <https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/10/26Apple-Introduces-the-U2-
iPod.html>. The discount was therefore just over 10 percent of the total value of the
combined package. This would be a “real benefit,” the existence of which depended on
the purchase of both products and would therefore qualify as an inducement within the
standard articulated in NutraSweet, supra note 109 at para. 162. But in that instance,
the tying product would have to be the device, not the music, since it was the purchase
of the device that triggered the discount.
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to access. You agree not to modify the software in any manner or form, or
to use modified versions of the software, for any purposes including ob-
taining unauthorized access to the iTunes Service. Violations of system or
network security may result in civil or criminal liability.114
This imposes an explicit contractual requirement that the customer refrain from ac-
cessing the service with software provided by anyone other than Apple. That would
clearly fall within the definition of sub-paragraph (a)(ii), but it only establishes a tie
between the service and the software, not the content obtained via the service and
any particular device.115 The agreement also imposes a requirement that the cus-
tomer refrain from modifying any security technology (a TPM). To the extent that
the TPM itself is the very barrier to using a device of another brand or manufacture
with the content, this requirement would seem to indirectly create a tie within the
meaning of sub-paragraph (a)(ii). Such a functional view would be consistent with
the French court’s approach in Que Choisir. Moreover, the scheme of the Competi-
tion Act supports this approach. The definition must cast a wide net in order to
catch all of the undesirable conduct; the remainder of the section narrows the focus
to exclude conduct which is not objectionable.
The situation would be quite different if the prohibition on circumventing the
TPM was imposed by law and not the agreement with the supplier. In such a case,
there would likely be no practice of the supplier to require the customer to refrain
from such circumvention. There would be no need for such a practice. The supplier
would simply benefit from a protection granted by law.116 Indeed, it could then be
argued that it would be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to encroach on that
benefit.117
But, on the assumption that there is a contractual tie, the question remains
whether the practice has an exclusionary effect that results in a substantial lessen-
ing of competition. Here, the Apple iTunes example is particularly interesting. In
2009, Apple abandoned the use of TPMs on music.118 This makes it possible to
compare market conditions with and without the practice. If the presence of the
114 Apple, “iTUNES STORE — TERMS AND CONDITIONS” (12 October 2011), on-
line: Apple <https://www.apple.com/legal/itunes/ca/terms.html> [emphasis added].
115 That tie would likely be saved under the technological relationship exception, which
will be discussed below, even if it otherwise justified a remedial order. See Competi-
tion Act, supra note 9, s. 77(4)(b).
116 The supplier’s practice might exceed the scope of the applicable legal protection. In
some circumstances the CMA restricts the protection it grants to those TPMs that are
authorized by the copyright owner of the underlying work. See CMA, supra note 2, s.
41. If TPMs were applied to work that was not subject to copyright, or in defiance of
the copyright owner’s wishes, this could potentially be an anticompetitive act even if
this provision came into force.
117 The analogy to an exclusive Intellectual Property right is imperfect: the CMA does not
include a right to apply TPMs within the definition of copyright. Instead it simply
deems circumvention to be an infringing act in certain circumstances. However the
policy argument that the Tribunal should not interfere with a decision that Parliament
has assigned to the rights holder can readily be extended to a deemed infringement. See
Warner, supra note 101; see also NutraSweet, supra note 109 at para. 173.
118 Rob Pegoraro, supra note 82.
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TPMs caused a substantial lessening of competition, one might expect competition
to have increased when they were withdrawn. In 2007, iPod sales represented 72.7
percent of the U.S. market for digital music players.119 In 2011, iPod sales ac-
counted for 78 percent of that market.120 Competition in the player market cer-
tainly does not appear to have increased in the wake of Apple’s move to selling
TPM-free music.
Finally, even if the elements of section 77(2) can be established, the statutory
language includes yet another hurdle to surmount. The Tribunal may not make any
order if the tied selling is “reasonable having regard to the technological relation-
ship between or among the products [. . .].”121 There is little case law to establish
what this means. The limitation seems to apply if the tie is reasonably necessary
because the use of unapproved substitutes for the tied product could harm the repu-
tation of the supplier, presumably because the tying product would not perform
adequately.122 If that is the extent of the provision, it would seem to have little
application. The supplier should not be able to shield an otherwise unlawful tie
under the aegis of an artificial compatibility problem; the only threat to the sup-
plier’s reputation would be of its own making. But the statutory language is not
obviously that narrow. It might extend to other technological relationships.
(c) Section 79: Abuse of Dominant Position
The language of section 79 is slightly different, but the analysis is largely the
same. The statute sets out the required elements: 
79. (1) Where, on application by the Commissioner, the Tribunal finds that
(a) one or more persons substantially or completely control,
throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of
business,
(b) that person or those persons have engaged in or are engaging
in a practice of anticompetitive acts, and
(c) the practice has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of
preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market,
the Tribunal may make an order prohibiting all or any of those persons from
engaging in that practice.123
119 Phillip Cruz, “U.S. Top Selling Computer Hardware for January 2007”, Bloomberg (13
March 2007), online: Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com/>.
120 Chris Nuttall, “iPod’s 10-year evolution a playlist of Apple’s greatest hits”, The Globe
and Mail (4 November 2011), online: The Globe and Mail <iPod’s 10-year evolution a
playlist of Apple’s greatest hits>.
121 Competition Act, supra note 9, s. 77(4)(b).
122 Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, Director of Investigation &
Research) v. BBM Bureau of Measurement (1981), 60 C.P.R. (2d) 26 (R.T.P. Comm.),
at 33 [BBM].
123 Ibid., s. 79(1).
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Control is equated to market power.124 The list of potential anticompetitive acts is
not closed; according to the Federal Court of Appeal such acts are to be identified
by “an intended predatory, exclusionary or disciplinary negative effect on a com-
petitor.”125 The substantial lessening of competition test is the same as in section
77 except that it makes explicit reference to past effects.126
In a marginal case, section 79 should be more demanding than section 77 in
the degree of dominance required, but broader in the range of practices that may be
captured. Apple’s market position in digital music players and digital music
downloads would seem to be strong enough to engage section 79(1)(a), assuming
of course that the Canadian market share is reasonably similar to the U.S. data.
A tying practice is necessarily exclusionary, so it would also tend to fit within
section 79(1)(b). But the advantage of section 79 is that one doesn’t have to fit the
practice into such a restrictive box. Even if the practice is characterized differently,
perhaps as refusal to deal or withholding a necessary input, section 79(1)(b) can be
satisfied based on an intended negative effect. While a mere refusal to license IP
will not be considered an anticompetitive act, “[i]f a company uses IP protection to
engage in conduct that creates, enhances or maintains market power as proscribed
by the Competition Act, then the Bureau may intervene.”127 But it is important to
note that the effect must be on a competitor; harm to consumers is not relevant
under section 79.128 The Tucker, UFC-Que Choisir, and Norwegian Consumer
Council complaints would, therefore, not fit within this section at all.
The “but-for” test for substantial lessening of competition defined in Canada
Pipe 1 applies, as discussed above. But the test applicable to section 79(1)(c) re-
quires a consideration of an alternative past as well.129 In 2004, Apple’s U.S. mar-
ket share was 42 percent.130 In 2002, it was only 7.1 percent.131 One could reason-
ably ask whether Apple, having achieved dominance on the basis of its TPMs, no
longer needs them because it is now simply enjoying a field free from challenge by
new entrants. The Bureau’s approach recognizes that “monopoly leveraging” can
124 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Canada Pipe Co., 2006 FCA 236, 49 C.P.R.
(4th) 286, 268 D.L.R. (4th) 238, 350 N.R. 264, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 57, 2006 CarswellNat
1762 at paras. 102–105, leave to appeal refused 2007 CarswellNat 1107 (S.C.C.) [Can-
ada Pipe 2]; see also Canada v. Pharmaceutical Society (Nova Scotia), [1992] 2 S.C.R.
606.
125 Canada Pipe 1, supra note 110 at para. 66.
126 Ibid. at para. 94.
127 Competition Bureau, “Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines” (September
2000) at 8 [IPEG]. This statement refers to recourse to the Special Remedies provision
in s. 32, but the logic can be generalized.
128 Ibid. at para. 79.
129 Canada Pipe 1, supra, note 110 and accompanying text.
130 Bryan Chaffin, “iPod Claims 82% HD-Based Retail Market Share; 42% All Players”,
The Mac Observer (11 October 2004), online: The Mac Observer
<http://www.macobserver.com/article/2004/10/11.11.shtml>.
131 Olga Kharif, “iPod: A Seed for Growth?”, Bloomberg Business Week (27 August
2002), online: Bloomberg <http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
aug2002/tc20020827_7649.htm>.
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occur over time “if tying discourages investment in research and development by
competitors, or otherwise discourages potential dynamic innovation that would be
profitable for competitors only if a larger portion of the market were
contestable.”132
But the history of the digital music player market does not seem to indicate
any lack of would-be competitors. On the contrary, one retrospective review seems
to indicate that, from 1998 to 2008, there were progressively more products intro-
duced each year by progressively more competitors.133 This is a far cry from the
BBM case in which there had been no entrants in the market for the tied product in
18 years, with no prospect of any to come.134 Although Apple clearly has achieved
a dominant position, the Tribunal, like the French Competition Council, would
probably perceive no significant barriers to entry.
Another potential explanation for Apple’s success could be that it out-mar-
keted its competitors. The critical period of 2003 to 2005, when Apple’s market
share exploded from also-ran to dominant, was also precisely the period of its “Sil-
houette” advertising campaign. In the first half of 2004 alone, Apple reportedly
spend $49.6 million on that campaign, a substantial fraction of the then-applicable
forecast of $400 million in revenue for the product.135 This coincidence is, of
course, not conclusive. But, in the absence of significant barriers to entry, it seems
likely to be somewhat persuasive.
The situation is not substantially different on the music side of the equation.
As of 2011 Apple had a dominant share of 70 percent of the U.S. digital download
market, with second place Amazon holding 14 percent.136 Amazon’s second place
share has been growing steadily for at least three years.137 Moreover Google has
just entered the online music store market.138 Beyond the paid download market,
there is a wide spectrum of alternate music-based service models, with over 400
132 AoD, supra note 111 at 37.
133 Andreas Ødegård, “Celebrating 10 Years of MP3 Players” (31 March 2008), online:
anythingbutipod <http://anythingbutipod.com/2008/03/10th-anniversay-of-the-mp3-
player/>.
134 BBM, supra note 122 at 35.
135 Bali Sunset, “Silhouette Campaign”, Marketing Campaign Case Studies (28 February
2008), online: Marketing Campaign Case Studies <http://marketing-case-stud-
ies.blogspot.com/2008/02/silhouette-campaign.html>.
136 Alex Pham, “Google Music debuts as sales battle with Apple, Amazon begins”, Los
Angeles Times (16 November 2011), online: LA Times
<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/16/business/la-fi-ct-google-music-20111117>.
137 5 percent in 2008, 8 percent in Q2 2009, 11 percent in Q4 2009, 13 percent in Q4 2010;
see Peter Kafka, “Amazon’s Digital Music Store Takes a Tiny Step Forward, Still
Trails Apple by Miles” (18 August 2009), online: AllThingsD
<https://allthingsd.com/20090818/amazons-digital-music-store-take-a-tiny-step-for-
ward-still-trails-apple-by-miles/>; Ethan Smith & Geoffrey A Fowler, “Amazon Can’t
Dent iTunes”, The Wall Street Journal (16 December 2010), online: The Wall Street
Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704073804576023913
889536374.html>.
138 Pham, supra note 136.
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licensed music services worldwide.139 Again, Apple’s dominance does not appear
to have relied on barriers to entry.
One is inexorably led to the conclusion that the hallmarks the Bureau and Tri-
bunal look for as indicia of a substantial lessening of competition are not present.
Prices are generally declining.140 New entrants are relatively plentiful. Product in-
novation remains vigorous. Where competitors have the option to “innovate
around” or “leap-frog over” an apparently entrenched position, there is unlikely to
be market power or a substantial lessening of competition.141 While some would-
be entrants have undoubtedly been stymied, the success or failure of individual
ventures is not the focus of the Competition Act. It is concerned with the market as
a whole, which seems reasonably healthy.
III. CONCLUSION
The global jurisprudence reveals that complaints based on abuse of TPMs
have, to date, only succeeded when they focus on harms to consumers. The suc-
cessful actions bear a superficial resemblance to the reviewable practices in Part
VIII of the Canadian Competition Act in that they identify similar practices as being
suspect: in particular, limiting consumer choice by imposing unnecessary compati-
bility problems via TPMs seems similar to restricting competition by denying com-
petitors the opportunity to provide alternatives.
But there are crucial differences of perspective. Consumers’ unsatisfied de-
mand does not fit within the Canadian Competition Act. Where there is a range of
products, none of which satisfies customer preferences, the Act may well nonethe-
less characterize the market as fully competitive. Moreover, this may be so even if
particular would-be entrants are prevented from responding to the unsatisfied de-
mand by the practices of incumbents.
Unlike the Que Choisir case, a mere tie is not enough to create a cause of
action under the Canadian Act. It requires that the tie have an exclusionary effect
that results in a substantial lessening of competition. TPMs cannot be entirely ex-
clusionary if competitors can choose not to use them.
This suggests potential circumstances in which a claim might nonetheless suc-
ceed. If a device with market power did not support unprotected formats at all,
139 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, “IFPI Digital Music Report
2011: Music at the touch of a button” (London: IFPI, 20 January 2011) at 6.
140 The original iPod launched with a suggested retail price of $399 [all prices in US$].
See Apple Press Info, “Apple Presents iPod” (23 October 2001), online: Apple
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2001/10/23Apple-Presents-iPod.html>. This is the
price of the most expensive iPod Touch available today, a vastly more capable device.
The entry level iPod Shuffle currently has a lower capacity than the original iPod but is
available for $49. On the music side, although Apple raised prices on some popular
music tracks from $0.99 to $1.29 in 2010, it dropped prices on others. Amazon re-
sponded with a price cut to $0.69 per track. See Alex Pham, “Price war! Amazon
launches 69-cent MP3 store for top-selling tunes”, The Los Angeles Times (28 April
2011), online: LA Times <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_blog/2011/04/price-
war-amazon-launches-69-cent-mp3-store-for-top-selling-tunes.html>.
141 IPEG, supra note 127 at 6.
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competing content providers would not have the choice to avoid the TPM. The
exclusionary effect could then cause a substantial lessening of competition among
content providers. Similarly, as in the RealNetworks case, if a competing device
maker had no prospect of obtaining its own parallel agreement with a content pro-
vider with market power, there is a real prospect that there could be a substantial
lessening of competition in the content market.
But real market conditions are not so extreme; even in highly concentrated
markets, the exclusion has never been complete. Rapid technological evolution and
equally rapid shifts in market share are characteristic of digital media and device
markets. Competitors have generally had the option of “innovating around” any
TPMs. As the VirginMega and RealNetworks cases demonstrate, available alterna-
tives will tend to undermine any claim of insurmountable barriers to entry.
Without barriers to entry, success is not anticompetitive. Moreover, the
VirginMega case also demonstrates how alternative explanations for that success
can undermine any causal link between the TPM and a dominant party’s market
position.
The RealNetworks case demonstrates that endowing TPMs with a privileged
status in copyright law limits the options available to competitors to innovate
around them. But because this is a restriction imposed by law, and not by the domi-
nant player, competition law would be unable to respond.
Those who seek protection from the protectors should not look for it in com-
petition law. Though this protection might have the result of promoting competi-
tion, the harm in question does not fit the competition law paradigm. The harms
that critics connect to TPMs are more qualitative than quantitative in nature. They
turn primarily on the ability to exert potentially unfair control over particular
choices, not the aggregate economic context of those choices. For the consumer
faced with the prospect of replacing a content library because a provider has aban-
doned a particular platform, the harm is the same whether the perpetrator has mar-
ket power or not. Similarly, if a license condition prohibits an open source software
product that can interact with protected content, it may be of little comfort to some-
one who wishes to use open source software that any number of proprietary alterna-
tives are available. These are harms to individuals, not to markets. So it would
make little sense that a remedy to those ills should depend on an economic analysis
of their competitive effects.
If there is a need to define new legal protections from the effects of TPMs, it
would be more appropriate to locate these provisions in consumer protection stat-
utes than in the Competition Act. This would permit the analytical focus to be di-
rected to the fairness or reasonableness of the practices and their impact on indivi-
dual choice, rather than on market power and effects on competition.
